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One Step at a Time:  






We study how gradualism -- increasing required levels (“thresholds”) of contributions slowly 
over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -- affects individuals’ 
decisions to contribute to a public project. Using a laboratory binary choice minimum-effort 
coordination game, we randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing 
at  a  high  threshold,  starting  at  a  low  threshold  but  jumping  to  a high  threshold after a  few 
periods, and starting at a low threshold and gradually increasing the threshold over time (the 
“gradualism”  treatment).  We  find  that  individuals  coordinate  most  successfully  at  the  high 
threshold in the gradualism treatment relative to the other two groups. We propose a theory 
based  on  belief  updating  to  explain  why  gradualism  works.  We  also  discuss  alternative 
explanations  such  as  reinforcement  learning,  conditional  cooperation,  inertia,  preference  for 
consistency,  and  limited  attention.  Our  findings  point  to  a  simple,  voluntary  mechanism  to 
promote successful coordination when the capacity to impose sanctions is limited.  
 
JEL Classifications: C91; C92; D03; D71; D81; H41 
Keywords:  Gradualism; Coordination; Cooperation; Public Goods; Belief-based Learning; 
Laboratory Experiment1 
 
1.  Introduction 
Cooperation and coordination
1 are important for daily economic, social and political activities 
(Schelling, 1960; Arrow, 1974; Cooper & John, 1988; Weingast, 1997). Yet, coordination failure 
is common (Van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991; Cooper et al., 1990; Knez & Camerer, 1994, 2000; 
Cachon & Camerer, 1996). Some studies find sanction institutions, social pressure and reputation 
to  be  mechanisms  that promote cooperation  (e.g.,  Olson,  1971;  Ostrom,  Walker  & Gardner, 
1992; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Gächter & Herrmann, 2010; Bochet et al., 
2006; Carpenter, 2007).
2 Others explore methods to facilitate coordination when sanction and 
social pressure cannot be imposed, such as repetition with fixed group members (Clark & Sefton, 
2001), complete information structure (Brandts & Cooper, 2006a), communication (Cooper et 
al., 1992; Charness, 2000; Weber et al., 2001; Duffy & Feltovich, 2002; Chaudhuri et al., 2009), 
between-group competition (Bornstein et al., 2002; Riechmann & Weimann, 2008), and gradual 
organizational growth (Weber, 2006).  
       In  this  paper  we  study  gradualism  within  a  fixed-size  group,  a  natural  and  voluntary 
mechanism to promote coordination where sanction and social pressure are absent. We refer to 
gradualism  as  the  hypothesis  that  allowing  agents  to  coordinate  first  on  small  and  easy-to-
achieve  goals  facilitates  later  coordination  on  otherwise  hard-to-achieve  outcomes  (“public 
goods”). This hypothesis has a long history in the domain of political science and international 
relations.  Abbott  and  Snidal  (2002)  present  a  recent  analysis  highlighting  the  role  that  a 
gradualist approach played in the development of the 1997 OECD Anti Bribery Convention. The 
authors study how breaking the final goal into a series of steps allowed the players to overcome 
the  challenges  emerged  in  previous  big-bang a p p r o a c h e s .  O t h e r  r e a l  w o r l d  e x a m p l e s  o f  
gradualism in coordination include the development of the World Trade Organization and the 
                                                 
1 In the experimental literature, generally “cooperation” refers to choosing cooperative action when non-
cooperative action is predicted by equilibrium in one-shot game based on self-interest (i.e., free-riding or 
deviating, rather than contributing or cooperating, is the best response given other others cooperating). 
The term is mostly used in public good games and prisoners’ dilemma games. “Coordination” refers to 
achieving a high efficient equilibrium rather than a low inefficient equilibrium when there are multiple 
equilibria; it is used in coordination games. In this paper, we use “coordination” in the traditional sense 
and focus on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria rather than other coordination games. But 
we employ the term “cooperation” more broadly than the tradition, one that also includes cooperative 
actions in coordination game: achieving a high equilibrium involves cooperative actions of all players. 
2  Arguably, these mechanisms can also help establish successful coordination.  2 
 
European  Union,
3 which  are  the  result  of  decades  of  negotiation  rounds,  international  arms 
reduction  agreements,  and  regional  and  international  environmental  cooperation.  Finally, 
gradualism finds its application in intra-organization team building (e.g. new employees may be 
given small initial tasks to help build coordination and to make sure that they can coordinate well 
in larger tasks later). 
       Mimicking a typical coordination setting in the real world, we conduct a computer-based 
laboratory experiment with repeated interactions. In each period, participants can only choose 
whether  to  contribute  or  not  to  the  group’s  common pool, with the size of the  contribution 
(which we call threshold or stake) fixed for each period and allowed to vary across periods. 
Each  member  realizes  an  extra  return only  when all  group  members  contribute  to  the  pool; 
otherwise each ends up with only the points that she does not give. This set-up is generally 
referred to as the minimum-effort or weak-link coordination games: the payoff depends on one’s 
effort and the minimum effort of group members. Our setting simplifies the payoff function
4 and 
is similar to a standard discrete public good  game, except that our set-up does not offer an 
opportunity for any individual to free ride.
5 Specifically, it is a multi-period stage hunt game due 
to the binary-choice feature in each period. 
        To study gradualism, we introduce three main treatments of threshold patterns, which differ 
in the first 6 periods but have an identical threshold for the final 6 periods.  The first treatment 
has a constant high threshold for all 12 periods; we call this “High Start.”  The second treatment 
has a constant low threshold for the first 6 periods and jumps to the high threshold for the final 6 
periods; we call this “Big Jump.”  Finally, in the “Gradualism” treatment, the threshold gradually 
increases in each of the first six periods until it reaches the high threshold by period 7. (See 
                                                 
3 Increased coordination level and organization growth are two key features in EU development. The 
former is the focus of our study; Weber (2006) examines the latter. A detailed introduction of the EU 
history can be found at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm. 
4 The literature of these games generally uses a complex matrix of payoff: there are 7 choices of actions, 
and the payoff depends on own action and the minimum action of others. See Van Huyck et al. (1990), 
Knez  and  Camerer  (1994,  2000),  Cachon  and  Camerer  (1996),  Weber  (2006),  and  Chaudhuri  et  al. 
(2009).  
5 Free  riding  is  generally  a  necessary  feature  of  a  public  good  game  in  the  experimental  economics 
literature. However, our set-up also belongs to the “weakest-link public goods game” as described by 
several theoretical papers on public goods (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1983; Cornes & Hartley, 2007). Cornes and 
Hartley (2007) provide a general social composition function of public goods with input of individual 
gifts, which incorporate standard continuous public goods, standard discrete public goods, weak-link (and 
weakest-link) public goods, good-shot (and best-shot) public goods, etc.  3 
 
Figure 1 for a graphical illustration.) Exploiting this design, we study the effect of gradualism on 
coordination at a high level of threshold.  
       Consistently with the stated hypothesis, our experimental results show that the gradualism 
treatment attains significantly more successful coordination at a high level of threshold. In our 
lab experiment, subjects in the “Gradualism” treatment are more likely to contribute in the final 
high threshold level periods than the other two main treatments.  In terms of magnitude, the 
effects are quite large – for example, in the end period,  61.1%  of  the  “Gradualism”  groups 
successfully coordinate, while only 16.7% and 33.3% of “High Start” and “Big Jump” groups do, 
respectively. 
       Our experimental results also suggest an externality of coordination building (or collapse) 
across different social groups. Those treated in the gradualism setting are about 10 percentage 
points more likely to cooperate upon entering a new environment. However, when they find their 
cooperation does not get rewarded in a new environment (because the new group members may 
have been treated differently and have different coordination outcomes in the first stage), they 
tend to become less cooperative.  
        We propose a simple theoretical framework of belief-based learning which explains our 
empirical findings. Participants have prior beliefs about others’ actions before the game starts, 
and update the beliefs according to the outcome in each period. A low threshold level at the 
beginning makes it cheap to attempt coordination in the face of uncertainty, thus giving them 
stronger beliefs that others would try to cooperate. Similarly, at each level where they manage to 
coordinate, they reinforce their beliefs about the likelihood of future successful coordination at 
slightly higher thresholds. On the contrary, if the threshold starts at a high level, initial failures 
undermine future cooperation. Finally, in the presence of big jumps, previous coordination at low 
thresholds does not affect players’ posteriors on actions at substantially higher thresholds levels. 
        We  also  discuss  alternative  explanations  of t h e  g r a d u a l i s m  m e c h a n i s m .  A  n a ï v e  
reinforcement  learning  model,  standard  conditional  cooperation,  inertia,  and  preference  for 
consistency have troubles explaining the “Big Jump” treatment. Limited attention or bounded 
awareness is not likely to apply for our experimental design. We discuss all these in depth in 
Section 5. 4 
 
        Although numerous studies study public good games
6 and coordination games, to the best 
of our knowledge, ours is the first study that clearly tests the role of exogenous gradualism in 
coordination within a given group and employs underlying behavioral theories. It is also among 
the first studies about how cooperation evolves over time with varying levels of stakes in multi-
period experiments. 
        It is worth pointing out that our study, adopting an exogenous (versus endogenous) setting 
of threshold path, tries to answer a mechanism design question from the perspective of social 
planner (e.g., an employer who cares about the performance of the firm or organization, or a 
benevolent government): what is the optimal path to build successful coordination at a high 
threshold? Our findings point to a simple, voluntary mechanism to promote coordination when 
the capacity to impose sanctions is limited.   
        Compared to the existing literature on coordination games, this paper also suggests a case 
where  limiting  choices  can  improve  social  welfare.  The  literature  on  coordination  games 
generally uses a complex payoff structure in which each individual has as many as seven choices 
for actions in each period (e.g., Van Huyck et al., 1990; Knez & Camerer, 1994, 2000; Cachon & 
Camerer 1996; Weber, 2006; Chaudhuri et al., 2009). For those with higher willingness to give 
in  the  first  period,  once  they  observe  their  high-cooperative  actions  are  harmed  by  low-
cooperative actions of their partners, they reduce the level of cooperation. After just several 
periods, an inefficient outcome is attained rather than a high efficient outcome, and the groups 
are  then  trapped  in  this  low  equilibrium.  In  contrast,  in  our  experiment  the  participants  are 
restricted to two choices in each period: giving a specified amount or not giving. A gradualism 
institution,  which  increases  the  specified  amount  gradually,  maintains  participants’  high 
willingness to give even when the specified amount becomes substantial. As shown in this study, 
limiting  choices  in  each  period  (but  without  mandatory or  semi-mandatory institutions,  e.g., 
sanction,  punishment,  and  social  pressure),  plus  a  well-designed  institutional  path,  helps 
participants reach a social optimal outcome. 
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related literature 
with more details. In Section 3, we detail the experimental design.  In Section 4, we present the 
graphs, tables and regressions, as well as explanations of the major results. Section 5 proposes 
                                                 
6 For example, Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984; Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker, 1989; Bagnoli and Lipman, 
1989, 1991; Marks and Croson, 1998, 1999. For an early literature survey, see Ledyard (1995). 5 
 
micro theories behind gradualism. Section 6 discusses potential extensions for future research. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature  
Our paper is closely related to two themes in the literature. The first theme explores comparative 
statics of thresholds in minimum-effort coordination games and discrete public good games. The 
second strand explores theories and experimental results about gradualism in prisoners’ dilemma 
games, public goods games, coordination games and trust games.  
        Schram, Offerman and Sonnemans (2008) study the comparative statics of thresholds in 
discrete public good provision, and find that a higher threshold lowers the rate of successful 
provision. Through fixing the required number of contributors and change the group size, the 
authors show that a smaller group size means a higher threshold.  
        In a laboratory dynamic coordination experiment, Weber (2006) studies the dynamics of 
organizational  growth  and  finds  that  gradually  growing  the  size  of  group  leads  to  more 
successful coordination in a large group versus starting with a large group. Our study differs 
from Weber (2006) in four major ways: (1) we explore gradualism in coordination within a given 
fixed-size group; (2) in our experiment, the choice set in each period is binary, and the payoff 
structure is much simpler than the one in Weber’s study; (3) We have a third main treatment 
“Big  Jump,”  which  helps  us  mimic  some  other  important coordination processes in the real 
world,  and  distinguish  alternative  explanations  of  gradualism;  and  (4)  our  theoretical  model  
incorporates the results of his study, while his cannot explain ours. 
        Our  experimental  design  and  results  show  much  more  clearly  the  efficiency  gains  of 
gradualism than the study by Andreoni and Samuelson (2006). They examine a twice-played 
prisoners’ dilemma in which the number of total stakes in the two periods is fixed, while the 
distribution of these stakes can be varied across period. Both theoretical and experimental results 
show that it is best to “start small,” reserving most of the stakes for the second period. However, 
cooperation  is  low  for  the  period  with  a  high  stake,
7 which  shows  their  gradualism  setting 
                                                 
7 When the relative stake of period 2 is high, there is more cooperation in period 1 but less cooperation in 
period 2; when the relative stake of period 2 is low, less cooperation in period1 but more cooperation in 
period 2. 6 
 
actually does not largely help improve cooperation at a high level of difficulty and stake and 
cannot serve as an effective tool to build cooperation.
8    
        Offerman and van der Veen (2010) study whether governmental subsidies to promote public 
good provision should be abruptly introduced or gradually increased, i.e., given the benefit of the 
public good, whether the individual cost of providing the public good should be decreased sharply or 
gradually. Their result favors an immediate increase of subsidy: when the final subsidy level is 
substantial, the effect of a quick increase is much stronger than that of a gradual increase. Our 
study differs from theirs in the following important ways. First, their motivation is about how to 
use  subsidies  to  stimulate  cooperation  after  cooperation  failures  at  the  beginning.  Our 
mechanism, on the other hand, does not need governmental subsidies to promote cooperative 
behavior; instead we use a low threshold (stake) to encourage earlier cooperation and a gradual 
increasing stake path to sustain cooperation at higher levels. Second, in our experiment, what 
may change is the stake level, which indicates both the cost and the benefit of the public good. 
Third, our stake paths are non-decreasing, while their cost paths are non-increasing. 
        There are some studies on the monotone game, a multi-period game in which players are 
constrained to choose strategies that are non-decreasing over time, i.e., to increase contributions 
over time (e.g., Gale, 1995, 2001; Lockwood & Thomas, 2002; Choi et al., 2008). In contrast to 
these studies, we employ a more natural setting and force the threshold (indicating difficulty and 
stake) instead of forcing the contribution decision to be non-decreasing.  
       Pitchford  and  Snyder  (2004)  develop  a  model  where  the  sequence  of  gradually  smaller 
investments solves the holdup problem when the buyer’s ability to hold up a seller’s investment 
is severe. However, Kurzban et al. (2008) contradict this prediction by showing that participants 
prefer starting with smaller levels of investment and increasing it, rather than the other way 
around.  
        In  two  theoretical  papers,  Watson  (1999,  2002)  shows  “starting  small  and  increasing 
interactions over time” is an equilibrium under renegotiation and commitment conditions. In our 
study,  the  stake  levels  over  periods  are  exogenous, w h i c h  d i f f e r s  f r o m  W a t s o n  ( 1 9 9 9 ) ;  a n d  
individuals do not know the path of stake levels in later periods, which differs from Watson 
(2002). 
                                                 
8 One example (and motivation) for their study is as follow s: “ An employ er forming a new  team  of 
workers may give them small initial tasks, to help build cooperation, followed by larger tasks that can 
take advantage of that cooperation.” According to their results, actually the workers will fail to reach 
successful cooperation for larger tasks. 7 
 
 
3.  Experimental Design 
Our study is a variation of the discrete multi-period public goods games, and can be classified as 
a minimum-effort coordination game with a much simpler payoff structure than the standard 
coordination games in the literature.   
 
3.1  Sample and Payoff Structure 
The laboratory experiment was conducted at Renmin University of China in Beijing, China in 
July 2010 with 256 participants recruited via the Bulletin Board System (BBS) and posters at the 
university. Most participants were students from this university  and universities nearby,  and 
people living nearby. All laboratory sessions were computerized using the z-Tree experiment 
software package (Fischbacher, 2007). Both the instructions and the information shown on the 
computer screen were in Chinese. 
        There were 18 sessions. In each session, we randomly assigned participants to groups of 4,
9 
so our sample consisted of 64 groups in total.  The experiment included two stages: the first stage 
comprised  12  periods,  while  the  second  one  had  8  periods.  In  each  period,  we  endowed 
participants with 20 points and asked them to give a certain number of points to their assigned 
groups’ common pools. The required number could vary across periods, and each participant 
could only choose either “not to give” or “to give the exact points required,” which we refer to as 
threshold or stake. If all members in a group gave,
10 then each member not only got the points 
she had given back, but also gained an extra return which equaled the required number of points 
(i.e.,  the  threshold).  If  not  all  group  members  contributed,  then  each  member  finished  each 
period only with her points remaining, and the points she gave out were wasted.  
        In sum, the following formula describes each period earnings: 
                                                 
9 For coordination games, four is considered as a small or moderate group size. For public goods games, 
Croson and Marks (2000) show in a meta-analysis study that the most frequently used group sizes are 4, 
5, and 7. In their own studies (Marks & Croson, 1998, 1999), each group consists of 4 players.  
10 Requiring all members to give makes the game a minimum-effort coordination game. Other reasons for 
this requirement are: First, it makes cooperation more difficult given the small group size of 4, and a 
higher difficulty level is where we may need gradualism; second, it makes the theory simple (for each 
single period, there are only two pure strategy equilibria, one with all group members giving, the other 
with  no  group  members  giving.)  In  an  accompanying  paper  coming soon,  the  role  of  gradualism  in 
voluntary provision of public goods is studied by allowing free riding in the game. 8 
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        Where  , it Earning  is i’s earning in period t,  t Th  is threshold (stake) at t.  ,  it A  and ,  jt A  are 
the  actions  of  i  and  j  at  t ,  respectively  ( i  and  j  are  in  the  same  group.)  C  represents 
“cooperate” (“give”), while D represents “deviate” (“not give”).   
        The final payment is the total earning accumulated over periods plus a show-up fee, and the 
exchange rate is 40 points per yuan.
11 The summary of the experimental design is shown in 
Table 3.  
 
3.2  Treatment Group Assignments  
Our experiment consisted of three main treatments: “High Start,” “Big Jump” and “Gradualism.” 
All groups in the three main treatments faced the same threshold in the second half (periods 7-
12) of the first stage, but the threshold paths for them differed in the first half (periods 1-6), 
which may have imposed an income effect in the laboratory. To  estimate how  much of the 
difference in performance among the three main treatments in the second half of the first stage is 
driven by an income effect, we introduced a variant of the “HighStart” treatment, namely the 
“High Show-up Fee” treatment, which we describe in more detail below. In 8 of the 18 sessions, 
12 participants were randomly assigned into the three  main  treatments;  in  the  remaining  10 
sessions, 16 participants were randomly assigned into the four treatments (three main treatments 
and one supplementary treatment). In total, we have 18, 18, 18 and 10 groups in “High Start,” 
“Big Jump,” “Gradualism,” and “High Show-up Fee” treatments, respectively.  
        In the first stage, the thresholds over 12 periods are shown in Figure 1: for the “High Start” 
treatment, the thresholds are always at the highest level,  which is 14 for 16 sessions and 12 for 2 
sessions;
12 for the “Big Jump” treatment, they are 2 for the first 6 periods and set at the highest 
threshold for the next 6 periods; for the “Gradualism” treatment, they increase from 2 to 12 with 
a step of 2 for the first 6 periods and fix at the highest threshold for the next 6 periods. The show-
up fees for these three treatments were 400 points for each individual. The “High Show-up Fee” 
treatment is the same with the “High Start” treatment, except that the show-up fee is 480 instead 
                                                 
11 The yuan/USD exchange rate was about 6.7. 
12 We calibrated the highest threshold level using 12 and 14, and finally decided to choose 14 in most 
sessions. To make full use of the samples, in the following analysis we pool all 18 sessions together.  9 
 
of  400  points.  The  extra  80  points  are  sufficient  to  capture  potential  earning  differences 
accumulated from periods 1-6 and thus to isolate the effect generated by an income effect by 
comparing the “High Show-up Fee” vs. the “High Start” treatment (we discuss this in detail in 
Section 4.)  
        When subjects enter the second stage of the game, they are randomly reshuffled into groups 
of four. New group members may not necessarily come from the same treatment in the first 
stage; this rule is made common knowledge. Within the second stage, group compositions are 
fixed, and thresholds are all set at the highest threshold for all periods and all groups, i.e., those 
treated in different treatments in the first stage face the same threshold in each period of the 
second stage.  
        The information structure is as follows.  
        Participants know that there are 2 stages, but not the exact number of periods in each stage. 
Instead, they are told that the experiment will last for 30 minutes to one hour, including the time 
for signing up, reading of instructions, a quiz designed to make sure that they understand the 
experimental  rule,  and  final  payment.  We  chose  this d e s i g n  f o r  t w o  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  t o  
eliminate backward induction in theory and a potential end-of-game effect, although backward 
induction is not well supported empirically in the literature, and we argue that in minimum-effort 
coordination games the end-of-game effect does not exist or will be just minor (see Section 6.6). 
Second, in many cases of the real world, people do not know the exact number of cooperation 
and  coordination opportunities  (e.g., how  many  times  they  will meet  each  other,  how  many 
projects they will have).  
        At the beginning of each period they know the threshold of the current period but not those 
of future periods. In many cases of the real world, the levels of future interactions are unknown 
ex ante. 
        At the end of each period they know whether all 4 group members (including himself or 
herself) gave the required points of that period, but not the total number of group members who 
gave (if fewer than 4 members gave). This is consistent with the literature of minimum-effort 
coordination games (e.g., Van Huyck et al., 1990), in which the only common historical data 
available to the participants is the minimum.
13 We can find further supports for this design from 
the  literature  of  contract  theory,  in  which  imperfect  observation  of  efforts  is  common.  By 
                                                 
13 In our experiment, if all 4 members give the required amount, then the minimum is that amount (or 
coded in a binary way, “1”); otherwise the minimum is 0.  10 
 
adopting this design we can also increase the difficulty of coordination given other aspects of the 
experiment. 
        Communications across players is not allowed. We chose this design for two reasons. First, 
communication is often impossible or ineffective in the real world. Second, this design makes 
coordination more difficult.
14   
        At the start of the second stage, each player is notified that they enter a new random group. 
At the end of each stage, each player is told how many points she has accumulated to date. 
        At the end of the experiment, we asked participants to complete a brief survey.  The survey 
collected  information  on  age,  gender,  nationality,  education  level,  concentration  at  school, 
working status and income, in addition to eliciting risk preferences over lotteries (see Appendix).  
 
4.  Results 
In this section we present our findings in summary tables, figures and regressions.  We analyze 
the effect of treatments on the following three outcome variables per period: whether a group 
coordinates successfully, whether an individual contributes, and the individual’s earning.  
        Table 1 contains basic summary characteristics of the participant pool. The participants are 
generally  young with an average age around 22, since 91% of them are college or graduate 
students. 41% are male. 12% are (or were) majored in economics, 16% in other social sciences, 
27% in business, and the remaining in other disciplines. The average individual annual income in 
the year of 2009 falls between 5,000 yuan and 10,000 yuan.   
        Table  2  checks  how  randomization  worked  in  assigning  participants  into  different 
treatments. The default category is the “Gradualism” treatment and the regressions do not have 
other control variables, so the constant term indicates the mean values of dependent variables for 
the  “Gradualism”  treatment.  There  are  no  significant  differences  in  subjects’  characteristics 
across treatments, except that participants in the “Big Jump” treatment have higher self-reported 
family economic status, that those in the “High Start” and “High Show-up Fee” treatments have 
higher risk aversion indexes, and that those in the “High Start” treatment are more likely to be 
students. This shows that randomization did very well, although not perfectly.  
                                                 
14 Ostrom (2010) summarizes that  communication improves  cooperation. Charness (2000) shows that 
communication helps coordination in small groups, while Weber et al. (2001) and Chaudhuri et al. (2009) 
find that large group coordination is still difficult even with communication.  11 
 
        Table 3 contains the summary of designs and performances of all four treatments in the first 
stage. Clearly, the “Gradualism” treatment has better performances of coordination for periods 7-
12 in the first stage, which shows that gradualism does promote coordination at a high threshold 
level. For example, in period 7, 66.7% of “Gradualism” groups have coordinated successfully, 
while the success rates of “High Start,” “Big Jump,” and “High Show-up Fee” are only 16.7%, 
33.3% and 30%, respectively. Once successful coordination has been established in period 7, 
generally it can be maintained subsequently (actually, only one “Gradualism” group failed to do 
this.) 
        In Table 4, Panel A provides summary statistics of the major outcome variables in the first 
stage: fraction of group members contributing, average number of group members contributing, 
success rates of groups (whether all 4 group members contribute) and individual earning per 
period.  We  also  provide  summaries  of  individual  earning  up  to  period  6  (i.e.,  earning 
accumulated from period 1 to 6, not including the show-up fee) for each treatment. On average, 
participants in the “Gradualism” treatment have the highest earning up to period 6 than all other 
three treatments. But the differences in means (and medians) are much smaller than 80 points, 
the  difference  of  show-up  fee  between  the  “High  Show-up  Fee”  treatment  and  other  three 
treatments.  For  example,  the  average  earning  by  period  6  is  143.94  for  the  “Gradualism” 
treatment,  and  112.42  for  the  “High  Start”  treatment;  and  the  median  is  162  and  106, 
respectively. This shows that a show-up fee difference of 80 points between the “High Start” and 
“High Show-up Fee” treatments is large enough to capture the potential income differences at the 
start of period 7 between “High Start,” “Big Jump,” and “Gradualism” treatments. Actually, if 
we add up the show-up fee, participants in the “Gradualism” treatment earn less than those in the 
“High Show-up Fee” treatment on average by period 6. So if we still find the “Gradualism” 
treatment has better performance than the “High Show-up Fee” treatment in periods 7 to 12 in 
stage 1, then the difference should not be driven by a potential income effect from the first 6 
periods.
15 Panel B shows the overall performance in both stages for all participants. An average 
participant  ends  the  experiment  with  an  average  around  857  points,  and  earns  21-22  yuan 
(around 3 dollars), which affords ordinary meals for 1-2 days on campus.  
                                                 
15 Real world income may also affect individuals’ decisions. By randomly assigning participants into 
various treatments, we rule out the possibility that the differences of performance are due to real world 
income. 12 
 
        In  the  figures  and  regressions  below,  we  break  out  these  summary  statistics  into 
performance by period to gain a clearer understanding of the different effects of treatments on 
behaviors and outcomes. 
        Figure 2 shows the average group success rates in each period for four different treatments 
respectively, and clearly provides us a stark result: gradualism does help build coordination. A 
group is considered as successful in coordination if all 4 members give the required amount in 
that period. In period 1, most “Big Jump” and “Gradualism” groups coordinate successfully at 
the low threshold, while only 3 out of 18 (or 10) of the “High Start” (or “High Show-up Fee”) 
groups are successful at the high threshold. Interestingly, there are both 5 (out of 18) groups in 
“Big  Jump”  and  “Gradualism”  treatments  respectively,  which  are  unsuccessful  at  the  low 
threshold in period  1 when the threshold is only 2.  
        A large gap between “Gradualism” and “Big Jump” treatments emerges in period 7 when 
the threshold increases significantly from 2 to 14 (or 12) for the “Big Jump” treatment. Both 
treatments have high success rates of approximately 70% for the first 6 periods. But the success 
rate of the “Big Jump” treatment decreases sharply to only 33.3% from period 7 (i.e., more than 
half of the previously successful “Big Jump” groups now fail), while that of the “Gradualism” 
groups remains at a high level of above 60% (only one previous successful “Gradualism” group 
fails during the last 6 periods.) The “High Show-up Fee” treatment has a success rate of 30% for 
all 12 periods, and about 16.7% of “High Start” groups succeed for almost all periods.  
        Interestingly, once a group has failed in coordination, it almost never becomes successful 
subsequently. The only  two exceptions are one  “Big Jump” group that  fails in period 5 but 
succeeds in period 6, and one “High Start” group that fails in period 1 but succeeds in period 2. 
This finding is consistent with Weber et al. (2001) and Weber (2006), in which they find once 
groups  have  reached  an  inefficient  outcome,  they  are  unable  subsequently  to  reach  a  more 
efficient outcome.
16 
        Conversely, once a group has succeeded, it almost always remains successful unless the 
threshold  increases  sharply  (i.e.,  from  period  6  to p e r i o d  7  f o r  “ B i g  J u m p ”  t r e a t m e n t ) .  
Conditional  on  successful  coordination  in  period  1, “ H i g h  S t a r t , ”  “ G r a d u a l i s m ”  a n d  “ H i g h  
Show-up Fee” groups almost are all successful in following periods (except that there are two 
“Gradualism” groups which failed to maintain it until the end of stage 1), but since the “High 
                                                 
16 However, changing incentives can improve coordination (Berninghaus & Ehrhart, 1998; Bornstein, 
Gneezy & Nagel, 2002; Brandts & Cooper, 2006b). 13 
 
Start” and “High Show-up Fee” treatments have a much lower success rate in period 1 than the 
“Gradualism” treatment, on average they perform much worse than the “Gradualism” treatment 
at a high threshold.   
        Figure 3 shows the fractions of individuals contributing over periods in the first stage for 
the  four  treatments.  “High  Start”  and  “High  Show-up F e e ”  t r e a t m e n t s  s t a r t  w i t h  a v e r a g e  
contribution rates above 60%, but decrease quickly over the initial periods and end at about 20% 
and  40%,  respectively.  “Big  Jump”  and  “Gradualism”  treatments  start  with  a  high  average 
contribution rate above 90%, decrease slightly over the first 6 periods to a rate of about 80%. 
However, the contribution rate decreases sharply from period 6 to 7 for the “Big Jump” treatment 
(when  threshold  is  sharply  raised  from  2  to  14),  while  that  for  the  “Gradualism”  treatment 
remains high. Although the contribution rates  of all treatments generally decrease over time 
(even for the “Gradualism” treatment), the results are consistent with Figure 2: except for the 
decrease  of  contribution  rate  from  period  6  to  7  for  “Big  Jump”  groups,  the  decrease  of 
contribution rates is almost all caused by those who give up cooperating when their cooperative 
actions at previous periods have not been rewarded because of coordination failure, while those 
have  succeeded  keep  cooperating.  The  differences  among  the  four  treatments  in  Figure  2 
(regarding group success rate) is much more stark than those in Figure 3 (regarding fractions of 
individuals contributing), since you need all 4 members to give at the same time to make the 
group coordination successful, which is much more difficult than asking only one person to give. 
This is why coordinating at the same pace is so important, and gradualism helps address this 
challenge significantly.  
        Figure 4 shows the average individual earning in each period. The results also show that the 
“Gradualism” treatment works best.   
        Table 5 shows the formal regression results for periods 7-12 in the first stage, when all 
treatment groups face the same high threshold level. The default category is the “Gradualism” 
treatment and the regressions do not have other control variables, so the constant terms indicate 
the mean values of dependent variables for the “Gradualism” treatment. Dependent variables are 
a dummy indicating whether an individual gives or not in period 7 and 12 (in Column 1 and 2, 
respectively), an individual’s earning in period 7 and 12 (in Column 3 and 4), and a dummy 
indicating whether the group has successful coordination: we consider period 7 in Column 5, 
period  12  in  Column  6,  and  since  this  dummy  is  our  main  variable  of  interest,  we  further 
examine all six periods from period 7 to 12 in Column 7. All standard errors are clustered at the 14 
 
appropriate level. It shows that the differences between the “Gradualism” treatment and other 
treatments  are  mostly  large  and  significant.  F-test ( u n r e p o r t e d )  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
between “High Start” and “High Show-up Fee” treatments are statistically insignificant, although 
it might be due to a relatively small sample. Moreover, the large and significant differences 
between  “Gradualism”  and  “High  Show-up  Fee”  treatments  suggest  that  the  advantage  of 
gradualism is not driven by the income effect in the laboratory. We also employ probit and logit 
specifications when the dependent variable is whether an individual contributes or whether a 
group reaches successful coordination, and the results are very similar with those OLS results in 
Table 5 (Column (1), (2), and (5)-(7)).
17 When the dependent variables are contribution and 
earning, which are at the individual level, additional regressions
18 with survey controls show 
very similar results with those in Column (1)-(4).
19  
        In Table 6 we examine whether the treatments in the first stage have effects on behaviors 
and  outcomes  in the  second  stage  when  participants  enter a  new  group. Note  that  everyone 
knows that the new group members can come from any of the four treatments in the first stage. 
Since the group formations are different from those in the first stage, we only look at individuals’ 
contribution  and  earning  in  each  period  of  the  second  stage,  rather  than  the  group-level 
coordination results. Interestingly, those in the “Gradualism” treatment in the first stage are more 
likely to contribute in the first period of the second stage. It is important to keep in mind that 
group assignment in stage 2 is a new randomization, and participants know that they are playing 
in a new group.  Thus, this finding is indicative of a new effect, namely an inter-stage effect of 
having been treated in a gradualism environment, which is similar with the finding of Bohnet and 
Huck (2004).
20 However, this effect disappears over the course of the second stage, suggesting a 
learning process where the behaviors of the different treatment groups converge as they observe 
the play of their new group members. For example, those in the “Gradualism” treatment find 
their new group members are not as cooperative as those in the first stage, thus becoming less 
willing to contribute in following periods.  
                                                 
17 Available upon request.  
18 Available upon request.  
19 There may be a concern that economics and business students play differently with other students. We 
address this concern by examining actions in the first period, as well as actions in the second period 
conditional  on  the  coordination  outcome  of  the  first  period,  and  find  no  differences  between 
economics/business students and other students.   
20 They study a trust game and find that trustees are more trustworthy in the stranger environment in the 
second stage after having been exposed to a partner in the first stage. 15 
 
        These  findings  suggest  that  the  gradualism  setting  can  induce  a  long-run  cooperative 
behavior,  most  likely  through  a  history  of  successful  cooperation  and  an  increased  level  of 
trust.
21 However, when they find their trust does not get rewards in a new environment, they tend 
to become less cooperative. This shows an externality of coordination building (or collapse) 
across different social groups.  
 
5.  Toward a Theory: Why Gradualism Works? 
5.1   Belief-based Learning 
Here we use a simple model with some assumptions to capture the most important feature of 
gradualism  and  explain  why  gradualism  works.  The  main  aspects  of  our  model  are  belief 
updating with  bounded  rationality  (especially  level-1  reasoning),  and  standard  self-interested 
preferences with risk aversion. Non-traditional (e.g.,  other-regarding)  preferences,  as  well  as 
other potential learning features which might be consistent with our results, are not incorporated 
into our model, since we do not need them to explain our main experimental results. A general 
learning model of dynamic games is beyond the scope of this paper. 
        There  are  two  main  types  of  learning  models:  belief-based  learning  models  and 
reinforcement learning models, which are both incorporated in a general model of experience-
weighted  attraction  (EWA)  learning  model  (Camerer  & H o ,  1 9 9 9 ) .
22 Belief-based  learning 
models assume that players keep track of the history of previous play by other players and form 
some belief about what others will do in the future based on past observations. Then they choose 
a best-response that maximizes their expected payoffs given the beliefs they formed. In contrast, 
reinforcement models assume that players do not have beliefs about what other players will do, 
and the propensity to choose a strategy depends in some way on its past payoffs rather than the 
history of play that created those payoffs. Reinforcement learning models do not apply well for 
our experimental results, since many participants in the “Big Jump” treatment who benefit from 
                                                 
21 It is possible that those in the “Gradualism” treatment contribute significantly more in first period of 
second stage just because of a wealth effect coming from their higher average earning from the preceding 
stage. Under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, this greater wealth could produce a 
greater willingness to contribute. While possible, we do believe that any income effect would be small, 
certainly not enough to generate the observed discrepancy.   
22 There are other models such as the quantile response equilibrium (QRE) model (McKelvey & Palfrey, 
1995). As suggested by Brandts and Cooper (2006b), given the strong dynamics and history dependence 
in our experimental data, static models such as QRE are not good candidates. Thus we focus on learning 
models in which some players have bounded rationality and learn how to respond from their experiences.  16 
 
cooperating by period 6 in stage 1 give up the passive strategy of continuous cooperation from 
period 7. Thus we propose a belief-based learning model, presented below, which matches our 
experimental results very well.  
        Crawford (1995) and Weber (2005, 2006) adopt an adaptive dynamics model, in which 
every participant employs a linear latent strategy weighting own action and the minimum action 
of group members in the previous period.
23 We do not use their model for two reasons. First, in 
their experiments, there are 7 action choices in each period, making a linear continuous latent 
strategy more relevant; while in our experiment, there are only 2 choices in each period, which is 
“more discrete.” Second, in their experiments, the game is repeated identically for all periods, 
while  in  our  experiment,  the  threshold  changes  over t h e  f i r s t  6  p e r i o d s  o f  s t a g e  1  f o r  t h e  
“Gradualism”  treatment,  and  from  period  6  to  7  for  the  “Big  Jump”  treatment,  so  a  linear 
weighting of previous actions cannot well predict and guide actions in the current period.   
        Our  simple  belief-based  learning  model  borrows  the  form  of  that  in  Van  Huyck  et  al. 
(1990), with features of a prior belief about opponents’ actions and a belief updating process 
based on the coordination result in the previous period, but differs from their model in two main 
aspects. First, in our model players’ choice set in each period is binary (either 0 or the required 
amount,  i.e.,  the  threshold)  and  thus  in  each  period  players  play  an  n-person  symmetric 
coordination game with two pure strategies. Second, players in our model are restricted to level-1 
thinking on their beliefs and are supposed to be myopic, that is, on one hand, players know their 
opponents’ choice rules and can form expectations on opponents’ chosen strategies based on 
their beliefs, but they do not know that their opponents know the choice rules of themselves and 
so on; on the other hand, when playing the coordination game for one period, players never know 
whether the game would be repeated in the future, needless to say that they do not know the 
future path of thresholds as well. Because of the restriction of level-1 thinking players cannot 
conduct deductive thinking and thus belief-updating across periods makes sense, and due to their 
myopia players do not conduct backward induction to solve the game so that we can focus on the 
one-period game and then analyze the process of belief dynamics.  
                                                 
23 Specifically, in their models, play i ’s latent strategy in period t is given by the following formula: 
,, 1 1 , (1 ) it it t it ax y         =   ++ , where  ,1 it x    is i’s discrete action in period  1 t   ,  1 t y    is the minimum 
action of group members in period  1 t   , and 01   << . The  , it   are distributed normally, with mean zero 
and variance 
2
t   . Play i’s discrete action in period t ( , it x ) is determined by  , it a  (e.g., by rounding the 
latent variable to the nearest discrete action).  17 
 
        Also, as the strategy set in each period is binary in our experiment, we further adopt a 
concept of “latent action.” Latent action refers to the amount of points one would like to give if 
there is no binary restriction on the choice set. In other words, latent action is the largest possible 
amount of points one would like to give in any period, and we call it “reserved threshold” in our 
context for clearance. If the reserved threshold is greater than the set threshold in the current 
period, one would give; otherwise she would not give. If one believes all opponents’ reserved 
thresholds are equal to or greater than the current threshold, she would give. It is important to 
point out that, from the perspective of a myopic player with level-1 thinking, her own reserved 
threshold is determined by her choice rule that relies on her belief of opponents, which should be 
past-dependent, and thus one’s own reserved threshold may change over periods; however, in her 
mind her opponents’ reserved thresholds must  be static because she does not know that her 
opponents indeed follow the same process to update their beliefs as well as reserved thresholds, 
and she can only update her belief on these static reserved thresholds of her opponents. The 
convenient assumption of level-1 thinking play a key role here: agents take their opponents’ 
reserved thresholds as constant but unknown parameters, which enables a gradually refining but 
consistent belief updating process on the distribution of these parameters. If we allow level-2 
thinking, then there will not be constant reserved thresholds, and the model will become much 
more complicated.  
        Suppose  there  are  I play ers who are  all risk  averse . Each play er i’s belief about every 
opponent j’s reserved threshold is
i
j B , which means that she believes opponent j will only give 
when the set threshold in the current period  t Th  is less than 
i
j B , otherwise that opponent will not 
give.  Each  player  i’s  belief  about  opponent  j’s  reserved  threshold 
i
j B  follows  a  cumulated 
distribution function  , ()
i
jt F ,  ji   , whose support  is [,]
ii
tt LB UB .  At  the  start  of  period  1,  we 
suppose the supports to  ,1()
i
j F  for all i, j are [0, ] UB , where UB is the highest possible level of 
reserved threshold,
24 i.e., the highest possible number of points one would like to give in players’ 
minds, which is not necessarily less than the endowment in each period. As discussed before, 
each player i is restricted to level-1 thinking, that is, she does not know that her opponents know 
her own cumulated distribution function  , ()
i
jt F , so that she does not take her opponents’ response 
to her own choice into account when she makes her own decision. 
                                                 
24 Setting UB   will not change our main results, but will make the analysis of optimal threshold path 
more complicated. 18 
 
        Now we study under what conditions a player would like to give in period t when the 
current threshold is  t Th , and in what manners she updates her belief.  From the perspective of 
player i, she will give if and only if she believes the probability that all her opponents will give 
exceeds  a  certain  value  () it Th   ,  which  denotes  her  risk  attitude.  In  our  framework o f  
coordination game, under the assumption of risk aversion, it is easy to see that 0.5 ( ) 1 it Th   <<  
for  0 t Th >  and  () / 0 it t Th Th      > . In this sense, assuming independent distributions of  , ()
i
jt F  
for all j, as each player is restricted to level-1 thinking and is myopic, player i will give in period 
t if and only if: 
  ,  Pr( ) (1 ( )) ( )
ii
jt j t t i t
ji ji
BT h FT h T h  
   
  =      !                    ( 1 . 1 )  
        For convenience, we define a new concept of “social reserved threshold,” the minimum of 
the “reserved thresholds” of each player’ opponents, which only exists in her belief. Specifically, 
player i’s social reserved threshold is 
i B  that implies she believes that all her opponents will give 
only when the set threshold in the current period  t Th  is lower than 
i B , otherwise at least one 
opponent will not give. Since 
i
j B  is static in player i’s mind, 
i B  must be also static in her mind, 
and thus a cumulated distribution function of 
i B  is well defined. From (1.1) we know that the 
cumulated distribution function of 
i B  can be expressed as follows: 
  , () 1 P r ( ) 1 ( 1 () )
ii i i
tt j t j t t
ji ji
FT h B T h F T h
   
=    =      !            ( 1 . 2 )  
        It is easy to show that the supports of  1 ()
i F  for all i are still [0, ] UB . 
        Therefore, player i will give in period t if and only if: 
  1( )( )
i
tt i t FT h T h                     ( 1 . 3 )  
        When  1 Th  is too high such that (1.3) does not hold, i chooses not to give; otherwise she 
gives. This explains why “Gradualism” and “Big Jump” groups coordinate much better than 
“High Start” and “High Show-up Fee” groups in period 1 of stage 1.  
        Next, we study the manner in which each player updates her belief. In a given period t, if 
(1.3) is violated, in other words, if player i choose not to give, then she cannot know whether or 
not her opponents have given due to the information structure, and hence she cannot update her 
belief on 
i B  at all.  However, if (1.3) is satisfied (i.e., player i chooses to give), there must be the 
following two cases.  
        The belief updating process is as follows. It is worth noting that the belief updating process 
does not follow the traditional Bayesian rule. As discussed above, the social reserved threshold is 19 
 
a determinant in a player’s mind, and thus it is regarded as a random variable only in the sense 
that  a  player  does  not  know  its  exact  value.  Specifically,  a  player  updates  the  support  of 
distribution  of  social  reserved  threshold  based  on  the  outcome  in  each  period,  which  is 
characterized in the following cases.  
        Case 1: all her opponents have given and thus the coordination succeeds.  As player i is 
restricted  to  level-1  thinking  and 
i B  is  static  in  her  mind,  she  now  surely  knows  that 
1( ) 1
i
tt FT h   = , in other words,  () 0
i
tt FT h= . This implies that player i can naturally update the 
support of  ()
i
t F  from [,]
ii
tt LB UB  to [, ]
i
tt Th UB . 
        Case  2:  at  least  one  of  her  opponents  has  not  given  and  thus  the  coordination  fails. 
Similarly, she now surely knows that 1( ) 0
i
tt FT h   = , in other words,  () 1
i
tt FT h= . This implies 
that player i can naturally update the support of  ()
i
t F  from [,]
ii
tt LB UB  to [,]
i
tt LB Th . 
        Conditional on successful coordination at t, for  1 tt Th Th +   , if  1 t Th +  is close enough to  t Th , 
and far enough from 
i
t UB , then (1.3) still holds, so i would continue cooperating until (1.3) is 
violated, that is why gradualism works. This idea will be formally presented in Proposition 1 
below. However, if  1
i
tt Th LB +    is too large, than there is a high probability that at least one of 
opponents’ “reserved thresholds” is lower than  1 t Th + , so (1) does not hold anymore, and i will 
choose not to give. This explains why the “Gradualism” treatment performs well, while the “Big 
Jump” treatment largely fails when the threshold jumps from a low 2 to a high 14.  
         Following the belief-updating rule, we can show the following lemma that is important in 
characterizing our final results. 
 
Lemma 1 (Belief Update) For any player i, there is  11 [,] [ , ]
ii i i
tt t t LB UB LB UB ++    for any period t.  
Proof: See Appendix A. 
        Based on our decision rule and belief updating rule for each player that can be naturally 
interpreted  under  the  assumptions  of  binary  choices,  level-1  thinking,  and  myopia,  we  can 
eventually get the following results regarding our experimental findings. 
 
Lemma 2 (Gradualism) There always exists a threshold  i Min
i
tt Th LB >  to guarantee successful 
coordination if 
ii
tt UB LB >  for all i for any period t. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
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Proposition  1  (Gradualism)  There  exists  an  infinite  path  of  threshold { } 1 | tt t Th Th Th +    to 
guarantee successful coordination from period 1. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 2 (Memory of Failure) In the path of the game, if there are and only are fewer than 
I players who have given in any period t with a threshold  t Th , the future threshold that can make 
coordination successful must be  t Th Th   <  for all  t   > . 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
        Our model can also explain the main results of Weber (2006), who studies gradualism in 
organizational growth. Staring with a large group size makes one believe that there is a low 
probability  that  all  partners  will  choose  a  high  action,  so  it  is  less  likely  to  reach  a  high 
equilibrium. On the contrary, starting with a small group size will give one a high belief that all 
partners  will  choose  a  high  action.
25  And  if  a  new  group  member  knows  the  previous 
coordination history of the group, she will have a high belief that all partners will choose a high 
action (and other partners, knowing that the entrant knows the history, will also have a high 
belief that the entrant will choose a high action), so they can maintain a successful coordination 
when the group enlarges. However, if the entrant cannot observe the history, a high trust among 
the entrant and incumbents cannot be established, leading to a coordination failure when the 
group expands.  
        The model can also explain the main results of other minimum-effort coordination games in 
the  literature,  e.g.,  Van  Huyck  et  al.  (1990),  but  not  some  minor  results  such  as  the 
“overshooting” phenomenon that some participants play below the minimum of the preceding 
period (see pp 241, Section V of their paper). Incorporating non-standard preferences into our 
simple model can explain these minor results.   
        Although we have shown (and will further show below) that belief-based learning is the 
most plausible reason of the success of gradualism, we do not formally test it in this study. Some 
recent papers confirm that the majority of, although not all, participants behave consistently with 
their  beliefs  (e.g.,  Nyarko  &  Schotter,  2002;  Costa-Gomes  &  Weizsäcker,  2008;  Rey-Biel, 
2009).  Direct  belief  elicitation  methods,  especially  in  an  incentive-compatible  way,  become 
                                                 
25 Note that in formula (1.1), the larger the group size, the smaller the probability one perceives that all 
partners will give at least a certain amount.  21 
 
increasingly popular in experimental economics (e.g., Offerman et al., 1996, 2001; Nyarko & 
Schotter,  2002;  Costa-Gomes  &  Weizsäcker,  2008;  Rey-Biel,  2009;  Hyndman  et  al.,  2009; 
Tingley & Wang, 2010). We finally gave up doing this because our main purpose of this study is 
to cleanly test whether gradualism works, and we had a concern that asking belief questions in 
each period would have undesirable effects on participants’ playing which may contaminate our 
results. The literature supports our concern: several other studies (Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 
2008; and especially, Rutström & Wilcox, 2004, 2009) do show that eliciting players’ beliefs 
induce more sophistication and higher-order rationality, thus affecting their actions.  
 
5.2   Other Explanations 
5.2.1   Reinforcement Learning 
As discussed above, a naïve reinforcement learning model predicts that participants who benefit 
from cooperating by period 6 in the first stage should adopt the passive strategy of continuous 
cooperation from period 7. But this contracts the findings regarding the “Big Jump” treatment.  
 
5.2.2   Conditional Cooperation 
Conditional cooperation assumes that players are willing to cooperate if others cooperate as well 
(Fehr  &  Gächter, 2000). Based on the same  reason as a b ove , a s im pl e s t ory  of c on di t io na l  
cooperation does not work, either. A more sophisticated version of conditional cooperation may 
fit the results better, as described below. 
        Some participants might reciprocate by contributing in response to the cooperative actions 
of others. Such reciprocity also opens up the possibility for strategic behavior, where a person 
might contribute in early periods to encourage others to do the same. More participants may 
choose this strategy and try an “initial venture” when thresholds are lower than when thresholds 
are higher at the beginning. This explains why the “Gradualism” and “Big Jump” treatments 
work better than the “High Start” treatment. 
        However, for the theory of conditional cooperation to better explain why the “Big Jump” 
treatment does not work as well as the “Gradualism” treatment, some refinements of conditional 
cooperation is desired:  conditional cooperation  may not be absolute and unlim ited, a nd m ay 
apply only when the thresholds do not have big changes over time. 
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        Where C and  D represent “cooperate” (“give”) and “deviate” (“not give”), respectively.
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        Where  1    and  2    are  positive  constants.  The  decision  rule  is  as  follows:  if  all  partners 
cooperated at  1 t   , then cooperate if the threshold increases less than a given amount, keeps the 
same, or decreases; if at least one partner deviated at  1 t   , then deviate if the threshold decrease 
less than a given amount, keeps the same, or increases; otherwise “conditional cooperation” is 
not used, and the self-regarding preference dominates.   
        Strong conditional cooperation may apply for some participants, but for others only the 
weak one applies. When the threshold increases by a large amaount (say, threshold increases 
from 2 to 14 in our experiment), those with strong conditional cooperation contribute if their 
partners all contributed in the previous period (when the threshold was at a low level of 2), while 
those with weak conditional cooperation may not keep contributing even if their partners all 
contributed in the previous period. This explains why the “Big Jump” treatment does NOT work 
well  in  building  coordination  at  a  high  level  of  threshold.  In  contrast,  for the  “Gradualism” 
treatment, the threshold changes slowly, which makes those with weak conditional cooperation 
still willing to contribute when the threshold becomes higher and higher. 
 
5.2.3   Inertia 
Psychological inertia
27 refers to indisposition to change. It is not successful at explaining why 
“Big  Jump”  groups  cannot  maintain  successful  coordination  when  the  threshold  increases 
quickly.  
 
5.2.4   Preference for Consistency 
                                                 
26 According to our experimental design, when an individual does not give in a certain period, she cannot 
know whether all other 3 members give or not even after the outcome is revealed.  
27 Inertia has been studied in behavioral public finance issues such as individual saving behavior (e.g., 
Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).  23 
 
A similar psychological theory is preference for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995), which means 
that  once  people  make  a  choice  or  take  a  stand,  they  encounter  personal  and  interpersonal 
pressures to behave consistently with that commitment. Similar with inertia, it cannot explain 
why “Big Jump” groups fail to maintain successful coordination. 
 
5.2.5   Limited Attention and Bounded Awareness 
Since the threshold step in the “Gradualism” treatment is small, is the gradualism effect due to 
limited  attention  (for  a  review,  see  DellaVigna,  2009),  or  bounded  awareness  (Gino  & 
Bazerman, 2009)? Our answer is no. First, participants were doing the single coordination task in 
our experiment, so there was no other information or task which would distract their “limited 
attention.” Second, although the absolute increment of the threshold in the gradualism treatment 
is small (2 points per period), it is significantly larger than those in the experiments of Gino and 
Bazerman (2009) and Offerman and der Veen (2010), which adopt much more gradual settings. 
Actually, in our experiment, the step of 2 is quite a large increase, ranging between 100% of the 
threshold size in period 1 and 16.7% of threshold size in period 6.  
 
6.  Extensions 
In  this  experiment  we  focus  on  certain  settings  of  gradualism.  Below  we  discuss  potential 
extensions for future studies.  
 
6.1   Information Structure 
In this paper we choose a certain information structure that parallels many cases in the real 
world, as discussed in Section 3. For example, participants do not know the exact number of 
periods;  they  only  know  the  current  threshold  but  not  future  thresholds;
28 they  only  know 
whether all group members (including himself or herself) gave, but not the total number of group 
members who gave (if not all members gave); they only know the dynamics of threshold in their 
                                                 
28 For the “High Start” groups, some participants may want to wait the threshold to decline before giving, 
so they do not give in the first period, but they then find that the threshold is always 14 and that they have 
missed the chance of future successful coordination. If they know ex ante that the thresholds are always 
14 and that coordination in the first period is pivotal, more of them may cooperate in the first period, thus 
having  a  higher  rate  of  successful  coordination  in  that  period  and  the  following  periods.  The  same 
argument may apply for the “Big Jump” groups in period 7 when the threshold jumps to the high level. 
Thus this new information structure may shrink the role of gradualism. However, even they know the 
threshold dynamics ex ante, participants may not be so rational and sophisticated to try cooperating in the 
first period. Thus how the effect of gradualism changes is still a pending empirical question.  24 
 
own group (ex post), but not that of other groups (even ex post), although they know that other 
groups’  paths  may  be  different  from  theirs.  How  the r e s u l t s  m a y  c h a n g e  w i t h  a  d i f f e r e n t  
information structure, which may fit other cases in the real world, deserves future exploration. 
 
6.2    Free Riding (The Case of Standard Discrete Public Goods) 
In this experiment we require all group members to contribute to get the benefits. What if we 
require fewer than all group members, say, 3 out of 4, to contribute to receive the benefits of 
public goods (i.e., what if we introduce the possibility of free riding as in standard public goods 
games?) The theoretical framework in Section 5.1,
29 plus some elements of social preference, 
can  still  work  here.  Assuming  m  is  the  minimum  required  number  of  contributing  group 
members to receive the benefit, a self-interested individual will give if and only if she has a high 
belief that exactly  1 m   of his or her partners will give. But according to the literature on public 
goods game, even one believes that there is a high probability that at least m partners will give, 
she may still give, i.e.,  some  may choose not to free ride. Thus we  may need to add some 
elements of social preference (e.g., conditional cooperation) into the simple model in Section 5.1 
for the purpose of the public goods case. Still, strategy uncertainty about others’ actions also 
exists in this discrete public goods game, and gradualism helps reduce strategy uncertainty at the 
high threshold level, so we postulate that gradualism still works in discrete public goods game 
with a reasonable group size and a reasonable payoff structure. This hypothesis will be tested in 
an accompanying paper coming soon.  
  
6.3    Group Size 
Coordination  becomes  difficult  when  group  size  increases  in  one-shot  minimum-effort 
coordination games (Weber, 2006). The effect of group size can also be incorporated into our 
theoretical model: holding others constant, a larger group size reduces one’s belief that all other 
group members will give, as shown by formula (1.1) in Section 5.1. A group size of 4 is not too 
                                                 
29 The model in Section 5.1 only needs self-interested preference (with risk aversion). This is largely due 
to the payoff structure of minimum-effort (weak-link) coordination game: A self-interest individual will 
give if and only if she believes that there is a high probability that all partners will give. Although this 
strategy is also predicted by conditional cooperation, theoretically we do not need social preference like 
conditional cooperation to lead to this strategy, so it is hard to distinguish the motivation of conditional 
cooperation from a self-interest motivation in this case of coordination game. However, as discussed in 
Section 5.2, a simple version of conditional cooperation cannot explain the results regarding “Big Jump” 
groups, although we still cannot rule out a more sophisticated version of conditional cooperation. 25 
 
large, so successful coordination at a high threshold of 14 is possible for those treated in a 
gradualism process, as shown in our results. A slightly larger group size makes coordination 
more difficult and gradualism more useful. But if the group size is too large, even gradualism 
may not help. On the other side, a smaller group size (2 or 3) makes coordination easier and 
gradualism less useful. In sum, the effect of gradualism will show an inverted-U relationship 
with group size. This hypothesis can be tested in the future.  
 
6.4    Highest Threshold Level 
In this experiment, the highest threshold level is 14,
30 given an endowment of 20 per period. 
How will gradualism perform when we change this level? Similar with group size, a higher 
(lower) threshold level indicates a more (less) difficult coordination task. This can also be shown 
by formula (1.1) in Section 5.1. So based on the reason as Section 6.3, we conjecture that the 
effect of gradualism will show an inverted-U relationship with the highest threshold level.
31  
 
6.5   Rebuilding Coordination after Coordination Collapses? 
This paper tests whether gradualism builds coordination for a newly formed group. Is gradualism 
also helpful for groups in which coordination and trust have already collapsed? For example, 
coordination at  a  high  threshold  may  collapse  due  to the treatment of “High  Start” or  “Big 
Jump,” or other reasons (e.g., conflicts between two countries or ethnic groups). 
 
6.6    Is There an End-of-game Effect in Coordination Games? 
The literature on multi-period prisoners’ dilemma games and public goods games shows an end-
of-game effect. Does such an effect exist in coordination games, thus making gradualism less 
useful in the final period? Our belief-based learning model in Section 5 predicts no end-of-game 
effect. Unfortunately, our experimental design in this paper does not allow us to test this,
32 since 
participants are not informed when the last period comes. However, we conjecture that the end-
of-game effect will only be minor or not exist. The reason is as follows. In public goods games 
and prisoners’ dilemma games, a best response for self-interested individuals is deviating (or free 
riding) given that the partner(s) is (are) cooperating (contributing), so a self-interested individual 
                                                 
30 In 2 out of the 18 sessions, the highest threshold level is 12.  
31 The turning point may not be necessarily smaller than the endowment per period, 20.  
32 In this experiment, participants do not know it is the end point when the last period comes, which fits 
many cases in the real world.  26 
 
will try to exploit his or her partner(s) by cooperating before the end period, thus inducing the 
partner(s) to cooperate in the end period, while she gains by deviating in the end period.
33 On the 
contrary, in minimum-effort coordination games, the best response for self-interested individuals 
to a cooperative action is cooperating, so deviating in the last period makes no sense as long as 
you have a high belief about others’ cooperative behavior through successful coordination at the 
same or a close level of threshold. Thus the end-of-game effect should be much less relevant for 
minimum-effort coordination games.
34 Empirically examining whether such an effect exists and 
affects the role of gradualism can be done in a future study.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
The  findings  in  this  paper  suggest  that  gradualism  --  defined  as  increasing  step-by-step  the 
threshold level required for coordination -- can serve as a powerful mechanism for achieving 
socially  optimal  outcomes.  In  a  laboratory  setting, g r a d u a l i s m  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  o u t p e r f o r m s  
alternative paths to coordinated behavior. We also find an externality of coordination building 
(or collapse) across different social groups. Those treated in the gradualism setting are more 
likely to cooperate upon entering a new environment than those treated differently. However, 
when  they  find  their  cooperation  does  not  get  rewards  in  a  new  environment,  they  tend  to 
become less cooperative as well. 
        We  propose  a  simple  theoretical  framework  of  belief-based  learning  to  explain  why 
gradualism works. This framework is consistent with results of our experiment and of Weber 
(2005,  2006).  Other  potential  explanations  of  the  gradualism  mechanism,  such  as  naïve 
reinforcement learning, standard conditional cooperation, inertia, preference for consistency, and 
limited  attention,  do  a  poor  job  of  explaining  the  main  findings.  A sophisticated version  of 
conditional cooperation may better explain the results. Due to the weakest-link feature of our 
                                                 
33 As long as a self-regarding component of one’s preference dominates, this statement holds even if we 
allow certain social preferences.  
34 As discussed in the introduction section, the general literature on minimum-effort coordination games, 
employing  a  complex  payoff  matrix  of  7 7,  finds  that  even  with  a  small  group  size  like  3  (more 
apparently with a group size of 6), the game has been largely converged to the least efficient outcome 
from period 5, and the groups are then trapped in this low equilibrium (Weber, 2006). However, this is 
different from the end-of-game effect in prisoners’ dilemma games and public goods games. Moreover, it 
should be noted that this result is due to the “freedom” of choosing from 7 actions in each period, as 
discussed in the introduction. Our experiment differs from these studies, and further contributes to the 
literature in the sense that by limiting choices in each period and by a gradualism institution, convergence 
towards an inefficient outcome can be avoided, and the social optimal can be attained.   27 
 
experiment, since the best self-interested response given others cooperating is to cooperate as 
well, actually we do not need conditional cooperation to explain our results.
35 But this does not 
rule out a sophisticated version of conditional cooperation. Further distinguishing the belief-
based  learning  (with  self-interested  preference),  conditional  cooperation  and  other  potential 
theoretical explanations is a topic for future research. 
        Although we show that belief-based learning is the most likely mechanism for the success 
of gradualism, we do not formally test it in this study. Although imperfect, we may still use the 
incentive-compatible belief elicitation method to suggestively show whether belief updating is 
occurring  and  whether  agents  play  according  to  their  beliefs.  We  can  also  test  whether 
gradualism helps most for people who do not know their group members than for those who are 
friends of each other before the experiment, since the latter group already has a higher trust level 
even without gradualism.  
        In this experiment we focus on certain settings of gradualism. There are many ways to 
extend this study in the future. Allowing communication and free riding, changing the group size 
and the highest threshold level, adopting a different information structure and a more complex 
dynamic  path  of  thresholds,  are  all  important  dimensions  for  future  study.  It  will  be  also 
interesting  to  examine  whether  gradualism  helps  rebuild  coordination  after  it  collapses,  and 
whether an end-of-game effect exists and affects the role of gradualism in coordination.  
        Compared to the literature on coordination games, this paper also  suggests that limiting 
choices in each period, plus a well-designed path of allowed choices, may help reach social 
optimal outcomes. This follows the spirit of “libertarian paternalism” (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003): 
“designing  institutions  that  help  people  make  better  decisions  but  do  not  impinge  on  their 
freedom to choose.”
 36 Questions about the optimal path to attain a long-run objective of social 
optimal  deserve future  studies  (e.g., the  best  way  of  intra-organization  training,  the  optimal 
process of political reform from an authoritarian regime towards a more open system). 
                                                 
35 Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) study the dynamics of free riding in standard public good experiments, 
and find that both belief updating and social preferences are important in explaining the results.  
36 In the gradualism treatment of our experiment, we limit the number of choices in each period to 2 (i.e., 
each one can choose not to give or to give the threshold in each period). Since our experiment involves 
collective interactions and thus a more obvious externality of own action on others, it is less surprising 
that limiting individual choices may be good for social welfare. What is more interesting in our findings 
is that individuals still have the freedom to choose between two options in each period (i.e., they are not 
forced to cooperate), and there is no sanction, punishment, and social pressure. 28 
 
        To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  our  study  is  the  first  one  that  clearly  tests  the  role  of 
exogenous gradualism in coordination within a given group. It adopts an exogenous setting of 
threshold path from the perspective of social planner. The results have important implications for 
future research on concrete real world policies to promote cooperation and coordination among 
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Figure 2: Success Rates of Groups by Treatment and Period in the First Stage 
 
  Note:  A  group  is  successful  in  coordination  if  all  4  members  give  the  required  amount 
















Figure 3: Fraction of Individuals Contributing by Treatment and Period in the First Stage 
 
Note: Contribution is a binary variable: 1 indicates that the individual gives the required amount 
(threshold) in that period, while 0 indicates not giving.                       38 
 







Table 1: Summary Statistics of Subjects’ Survey Information 
 
Variable  Mean and  standard deviation  Observations 
Age  22.05 (3.25)  255 
Male  0.41 (0.49)  255 
Income  1.32 (1.38)  255 
Family Income  5.63 (2.69)  189 
Family Economic Status  2.60 (0.74)  254 
Risk Aversion Index  4.47 (1.80)  250 
Han nationality  0.91 (0.29)  255 
Student  0.91 (0.29)  255 
Concentration:     
Economics  0.12 (0.33)  241 
Other Social Sciences  0.16 (0.37)  241 
Business  0.27 (0.45)  241 
Humanity  0.12 (0.33)  241 
Science  0.15 (0.35)  241 
Engineering  0.17 (0.38)  241 
Medical/Health  0.01 (0.09)  241 
Note: Income is a scale variable from 0 to 13, with higher value indicating higher 
income (0: no income; 1: annual income<5000 yuan; 13: annual income>160,000 
yuan). Family income is a scale variable from 1 to 12, with higher value indicating 
higher income (1: annual income<5000 yuan; 12: annual income>200,000 yuan).    
Family  economic  status  is  coded  in  the  following  way:  1  (lower),  2  (lower 
middle), 3 (middle), 4 (upper middle), 5 (upper). Risk aversion index is a 
scale  from  0  to  10,  with  a  higher  value  approximately  indicating  higher  risk 























Table 2: Comparison of Participants’ Characteristics by Treatment 
 
  Dependent Variable 
 












  (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
HIGH START  -0.306  -0.042  -0.125  -0.083  0.474*  0.028  0.083*  0.026  0.006 
  (0.612)  (0.081)  (0.241)  (0.123)  (0.279)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.056)  (0.078) 
BIG JUMP  -0.278  0.076  -0.360  0.217*  0.424  0.013  0.055  -0.000  0.030 
  (0.627)  (0.083)  (0.236)  (0.128)  (0.295)  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.080) 
HIGH SHOWUP FEE  -0.111  0.086  0.056  -0.197  0.795**  -0.028  -0.050  0.053  -0.126 
  (0.695)  (0.098)  (0.336)  (0.146)  (0.399)  (0.063)  (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.081) 
Constant  22.236***  0.389***  1.444***  2.597***  4.097***  0.903***  0.875***  0.104***  0.284*** 
  (0.547)  (0.058)  (0.204)  (0.094)  (0.197)  (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.056) 
Observations  255  255  255  254  250  255  255  241  241 
R-squared  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.01 
Note: The default treatment is “Gradualism.” Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 






Table 3: Summary of Treatments in the First Stage 
 
Treatment  High Start  Big Jump  Gradualism  High Showup Fee 
Endowment in each period  20  20  20  20 
Show up Fee (points)  400  400  400  480 
Exchange Rate (points/yuan)  40  40  40  40 
Threshold in period  1  14*  2  2  14* 
Threshold in period  6  14*  2  12  14* 
Threshold in period  7-12  14*  14*  14*  14* 
Number of groups  18  18  18  10 
Number of subjects  72  72  72  40 
Number of groups successful in 
period  1  3  13  13  3 
Number of groups successful in 
period  7  3  6  12  3 
Number of groups successful in 
period  12  3  6  11  3 
Percent  of groups successful in 
period  1  16.7%  72.2%  72.2%  30% 
Percent  of groups successful in 
period  7  16.7%  33.3%  66.7%  30% 
Percent  of groups successful in 
period  12  16.7%  33.3%  61.1%  30% 42 
 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Performance 
 
 
Panel A: Performances over Periods in the First Stage 
 
Variable  All Subjects  High Start  Big Jump  Gradualism  High  
Show-up Fee 
All 12 periods:           



















































           
Observations 
(subject*period) 
3072  864  864  864  480 
           
First 6 periods only:           
Individual earning up to 
Period 6 
127.52  112.42  126.31  143.94  127.35 
  (37.38)  (46.32)  (7.84)  (27.22)  (53.35) 
Median of individual 
earning up to Period 6 
120  106  130  162  106 
Observations (subject)  256  72  72  72  40 
    
 
  













Observations  256 
Note: The mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) are reported in the table. For variables in 
Panel A, there is one observation for each of the 256 subjects in each period over the 12 periods of the 
first stage. For the variable in Panel B, i.e., individual total earning (including show-up fee) of the 
whole game (including both stages), there are only 256 observations, since it is only attained at the end 
of the game. The actual earning in yuan from the experiment is the total earning in points divided by 
40. The exchange rate of yuan/USD was about 6.7. 43 
 
 
Table 5: Contribution, Earning and Success in Periods 7-12 of the First Stage by Treatments 
  Individual Contribution  Individual Earning  Success (Group-level) 
 P e r i o d   7   P e r i o d   1 2   P e r i o d   7   P e r i o d   1 2   P e r i o d   7   P e r iod 12  Period 
7-12 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
HIGH START  -0.431***  -0.403***  -7.861***  -6.639***  -0.500***  -0.444**  -0.454*** 
  (0.126)  (0.136)  (2.472)  (2.401)  (0.171)  (0.170)  (0.144) 
BIG JUMP  -0.056  -0.278*  -8.528***  -3.889  -0.333*  -0.278  -0.287* 
  (0.113)  (0.152)  (3.076)  (2.587)  (0.185)  (0.182)  (0.157) 
HIGH SHOWUP FEE  -0.286*  -0.292  -6.028*  -4.467  -0.367*  -0.311  -0.320* 
  (0.158)  (0.176)  (3.203)  (3.049)  (0.199)  (0.201)  (0.186) 
Constant  0.736***  0.667***  28.278***  27.667***  0.667***  0.611***  0.620*** 
  (0.092)  (0.107)  (1.909)  (1.925)  (0.117)  (0.121)  (0.114) 
Observations  256  256  256  256  64  64  384 
R-squared  0.13  0.10  0.13  0.10  0.16  0.13  0.13 
Note: The default treatment is “Gradualism.” Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Individual contribution and group-level success are binary variables. Standard errors are 
clustered at session level for (5) and (6), and clustered at group level for all other regressions. The observations are at 
individual level for regression (1)-(4), and at group level for regression (5)-(7). There are 256 participants in 64 groups 
of 18 sessions. When we add survey controls for regression (1)-(4) where the observations are at individual level, the 
results (not reported) remain similar. 44 
 
 
Table 6: Contribution and Earning in Each Period of the second Stage by Treatment 
  Period 1    Period 2    Whole Stage 
  Contribution  Earning    Contribution  Earning    Contribution  Earning 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
HIGH START  -0.125*  1.639    0  0.389    0.00174  0.514 
  (0.0693)  (1.764)    (0.0727)  (1.524)    (0.0519)  (1.143) 
BIG JUMP  -0.0972  3.111    0  1.833    0.0660  1.240 
  (0.0720)  (1.890)    (0.0914)  (1.500)    (0.0658)  (1.297) 
HIGH SHOWUP FEE  -0.161*  -1.467    0.0528  -5.100**    -0.0958  -2.447 
  (0.0892)  (2.438)    (0.0913)  (2.230)    (0.0710)  (1.541) 
Constant  0.861***  18.17***    0.597***  21.75***    0.505***  22.47*** 
  (0.0474)  (1.895)    (0.0639)  (1.493)    (0.0577)  (1.195) 
Observations  256  256    256  256    2,048  2,048 
R-squared  0.020  0.018    0.002  0.044    0.011  0.016 
Note: The default treatment is “Gradualism.” Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are 
all clustered at group level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Individual 





Appendix A: Proofs 
Lemma 1 (Belief Update) For any player i, there is  11 [,] [ , ]
ii i i
tt t t LB UB LB UB ++    for any period t.  
Proof: From period t to period t+1, there are three cases regarding player i’s belief updating as 
follows. 
        Case 1: Player i has not given at period t. There is  11 [,] [ , ]
ii i i
tt t t LB UB LB UB ++ = . 
        Case  2:  Player  i h a s  g i v e n  a t  p e r i o d  t a n d  t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  s u c c e e d s .  T h e r e  i s  
11 [,] [ , ]
ii i
tt t t LB UB Th UB ++ =  where 
ii
tt t LB Th UB <<. 
        Case  3:  Player  i h a s  g i v e n  a t  p e r i o d  t a n d  t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  f a i l s .  T h e r e  i s  
11 [,] [ , ]
ii i
tt t t LB UB LB Th ++ =  where 
ii
tt t LB Th UB <<. 
        Hence, in all cases there is  11 [,] [ , ]
ii i i
tt t t LB UB LB UB ++   .  Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2 (Gradualism) There always exists a threshold  i Min
i
tt Th LB >  to guarantee successful 
coordination if 
ii
tt UB LB >  for all i for any period t. 
Proof: Consider the following equations for all i: 
1( )( ) i FT h T h tt t i     =  
        As  ()
i
t F  and  () i    are both increasing,  () 0
ii
tt FL B= ,  () 1
ii
tt FU B =  and 0.5 ( ) 1 it Th   << , there 
must be a unique solution 
* i
t Th  for eath player i.  
        Since 
ii
tt UB LB >  for all i for any period t, there must be 
* ii









tt t Th Th LB =>. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition  1  (Gradualism)  There  exists  an  infinite  path  of  threshold  { } 1 | tt t Th Th Th +    to 
guarantee successful coordination from period 1. 
Proof: We prove this corollary by mathematical induction.  
        At period 1, the supports of  1 ()
i F  for all i are [0, ] UB , and thus 
ii
tt UB LB >  is satisfied for all 
i. Hence Lemma 2 applies and there exists a  1 Th  to guarantee successful coordination. 
        Note that, if a coordination succeeds at period t, there is  1
ii
tt UB UB + =  for all i. 
        Therefore, in period t given coordination succeed at all periods prior to t, the upper bound of 
supports  of  ()
i
t F  for all i a re  s t i ll  UB ,  and  thus 
ii
tt UB LB >  is  still  satisfied  for  all  i.  Hence 
Lemma 2 still applies and there exists a  t Th  to guarantee successful coordination. 
        This process will never stop, and  1 tt Th Th +    is ensured by Lemma 1.  Furthermore, we can 
see that there is  1 tt Th Th + >  as long as  t Th UB <  from Lemma 2.  Q.E.D. 46 
 
 
Proposition 2 (Memory of Failure) In the path of the game, if there are and only are fewer than 
I players who have given in any period t with a threshold  t Th , the future threshold that can make 
coordination successful must be  t Th Th   <  for all  t   > . 
Proof: We prove this proposition by contradiction. At period t, there are and only are fewer than 
I players who have given. Hence, the coordination fails at period t, and for any player i who has 
given,  her  support  of  1()
i
t F +  at  time  t+1 i s  [,]
ii
tt LB Th .  Suppose  there  is  a  coordination  with 
t Th Th      at  period  t   > .  This  requires  player  i’s  support  of  ()
i F    to  be  [,]
ii LB UB     where 




Appendix B: Experimental Instruction 
 
The  study  is  conducted  anonymously.  Participants will  be identified  only  by  code  numbers. 
There is no communication among the participants. The experiment will last from 30 minutes to 
one hour. Please raise your hand if anything is unclear to you.  
 
Experiment Structure 
This experiment will consist of 2 independent stages. You will receive instructions for each stage 
on the screen before that stage begins. In each stage, you are playing in a group of 4 members 
(including yourself). For each stage, the group members are randomly selected and would NOT 
change during that stage. However, the groups would be reshuffled in new groups after the first 
stage. 
Rule of Each Period 
Please  note  that  the  experiment consists  of  2  stages, and  each  stage  has  some  periods.  The 
following rule applies to each period.  
 
In each period, you are assigned an endowment of 20 points, and asked to give a stated amount 
to a group pool. The stated amount may change across periods. In each period you can decide 
whether not to give, or to give exactly that amount, but can not give other points. You cannot 
know others’ choices when you make your own decision.  
 
If all 4 members of your group (including yourself) give the stated amount, you will get twice 
that amount back (thus having a net return equaling that amount). But if not all of your group 
members give, you will NOT get any of your given points back and will thus end the period with 
only the points you do not give.  
 
So in each period, your earning will depend on the following cases:  
 
Case 1: If all 4 members give the stated amount, then you earn: 20+that amount 
 
Case 2: If you give, but not all other 3 members give, then you earn: 20-that amount 
 
Case 3: If you do not give, no matte whether other members give or not, then you earn: 20 
 
A special case of Case 3 is as follows: 
•  Case 4: If all 4 members do not give, then you earn 20 (each of 4 members earns 
20) 
Examples 
Example 1: You are asked to give 10 points. You give, and all other group members also give. 
Then in this period each of you earns 20+10=30 points. 
 
Example 2: You are asked to give 10 points. You give, two other group members also give, but 
the last one does not. Then in this period, each of you and the other two members earns 20-
10=10 points, while the last member earns 20 points. 
 48 
 
Example 3: You are asked to give 10 points. You do not give, but all three other group members 
give. Then in this period you earn 20 points, and each of the three other members earns 20-
10=10 points. 
 
We will have examinations on the computer to make sure you understand the rule. You can start 
the experiment only after you answer all questions correctly.  
 
Payment 
Your final payment for this experiment is the sum of two parts. The first is a show-up fee of 
about 400 points.
1 The second is a performance payment, i.e., the sum of your earnings from all 
periods in two stages. The conversion rate is 40 points = ¥1.00. All payments will be in cash.  
 
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to fill out a simple questionnaire. Then you can 
collect your earnings by presenting your code number to the supervisor. Your earnings will be in 
an envelope marked with your code number.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For the eight sessions without the “High Show-up Fee” treatment, it is stated as “a show-up fee of 400 
points.”  49 
 
Appendix C: Risk Aversion Questions 
 





In the table below, you are presented with a choice between two lotteries, A or B, along with the 
payoff matrix for each lottery.  
 
For example, the first row shows that lottery A offers a 10% chance of receiving ¥20.00 and a 
90% chance of receiving ¥16.00. Similarly, lottery B offers a 10% chance of receiving ¥38.50 
and a 90% chance of ¥1.00. 
 
In the third table column, simply indicate given the two lotteries in each row, which one would 
you prefer if you are given the choice? A or B for each row? 
 
Lottery A  Lottery B  Your lottery choice 
prob(¥20.00)  prob(¥16.00)  prob(¥38.50)  prob(¥1.00)        
                                   
0.1  ¥20.00  0.9  ¥16.00  0.1  ¥38.50  0.9  ¥1.00          
                                   
0.2  ¥20.00  0.8  ¥16.00  0.2  ¥38.50  0.8  ¥1.00             
                                   
0.3  ¥20.00  0.7  ¥16.00  0.3  ¥38.50  0.7  ¥1.00             
                                   
0.4  ¥20.00  0.6  ¥16.00  0.4  ¥38.50  0.6  ¥1.00             
                                   
0.5  ¥20.00  0.5  ¥16.00  0.5  ¥38.50  0.5  ¥1.00             
                                   
0.6  ¥20.00  0.4  ¥16.00  0.6  ¥38.50  0.4  ¥1.00             
                                   
0.7  ¥20.00  0.3  ¥16.00  0.7  ¥38.50  0.3  ¥1.00             
                                   
0.8  ¥20.00  0.2  ¥16.00  0.8  ¥38.50  0.2  ¥1.00             
                                   
0.9  ¥20.00  0.1  ¥16.00  0.9  ¥38.50  0.1  ¥1.00          
                           
1  ¥20.00  0  ¥16.00  1  ¥38.50  0  ¥1.00             
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